The fact that small departures from complete information might have large effects on the set of equilibrium payoffs draws interest in the adverse selection approach to study reputations in repeated games. It is well known that these large effects on the set of equilibrium payoffs rely on long-run players being arbitrarily patient. We study reputation games where a long-run player plays a fixed stage-game against an infinite sequence of short-run players under imperfect public monitoring. We show that in such games, introducing arbitrarily small incomplete information does not open the possibility of new equilibrium payoffs far from the complete information equilibrium payoff set. This holds true no matter how patient the long-run player is, as long as her discount factor is fixed. This result highlights the fact that the aforementioned large effects arise due to an order of limits argument, as anticipated.
Introduction
One of the most prominent results in the reputations literature is due to Levine (1989, 1992) , who studied infinitely repeated, reputation games where a long-run player faces an infinite sequence of short-run players. They showed that an arbitrarily patient strategic long-run player can guarantee herself a payoff close to her Stackelberg payoff when there is a small ex ante probability that the long-run player is a commitment type who always plays the Stackelberg action. Their result implies that quite small perturbations of the complete information model might have large effects on the set of limit equilibrium payoffs.
This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with incomplete information as in Fudenberg and Levine (1992) , when the long-lived player's discount factor is fixed. We show that even when the discount factor of the long-run player is very high, arbitrarily small perturbations cannot open the possibility of equilibrium payoffs far from the complete information equilibrium payoff set-as long as the discount factor of the long-run player is fixed.
Our main result might seem in stark contrast with the opening quotation of this paper, yet, it is indeed complementary to Fudenberg and Levine's (1992) result. Our main result highlights that, as anticipated, Fudenberg and Levine's (1992) result holds true due to a specific order of limits. That is, if the discount factor of the long-run player tends to 1 while holding the commitment type's ex ante probability fixed, then the aforementioned reputation result à la Fudenberg and Levine (1992) holds true; however, if the commitment type's ex ante probability tends to 0 while holding the discount factor of the long-run player fixed, then the incomplete information equilibrium payoffs cannot be far from the complete information equilibrium payoff set. As far as we know, this is the first paper that explicitly points out the importance of the order of limits issue in these results.
From a technical point of view, our main result is an upper-hemi continuity result. We show that in reputation games of this type, the equilibrium payoff set is, for a fixed discount factor, upper-hemi continuous in the prior probability that the long-run player is a commitment type at zero when there is full-support imperfect public monitoring. We are aware that upper-hemi continuity results in the game theory literature are plenty. Yet, our result is the first result that explicitly provides a proof for the current upper-hemi continuity property, which highlights the order of limits issue in the reputations literature. Furthermore, given Bayesian updating, sequential rationality, and the dynamic structure of reputation games, our result is not a straightforward generalization of any such result in the literature. Other techniques might, of course, be used to prove similar results, yet our method of proof is relatively novel, employing the Abreu et al. (1990) techniques. We believe that this is another technical contribution of this paper because using such techniques to study repeated games with incomplete information is rare. 1 It is our hope that our proof will inspire other researchers to use similar techniques to tackle similar problems in the literature.
While Cripps and Thomas (2003) established both upper-hemi continuity and lowerhemi continuity of the equilibrium payoff set of repeated games with two long-lived players with equal discount factors when one-sided incomplete information vanishes, their results do not extend to our setting. Unfortunately, we fail to provide a proof (or a counter-example) for the lower-hemi continuity counterpart of our result, thus this stays as a hard open problem. An affirmative conjecture for a necessary condition of the lower-hemi continuity counterpart of our result was done by Cripps et al. (2004) , but they also failed to provide a proof or a counter-example for this necessary condition. 2 3
Related literature
The first papers that introduced the adverse selection approach to study reputations are , , and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) . They show that the intuitive expectation of cooperation in early rounds of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma and entry deterrence in early rounds of the chain store game can be rationalized due to "reputation effects".
As mentioned above, Levine (1989, 1992) extended this idea to infinitely repeated games and showed that a patient long-run player facing infinitely many short-run players can guarantee herself a payoff close to her Stackelberg payoff when there is a slight probability that the long-run player is a commitment type who always plays the Stackelberg action. When compared to the folk theorem (see Fudenberg and Maskin 1986; , their results imply another intuitive expectation: the equilibria with relatively high payoffs are more likely to arise due to reputation effects. Fudenberg et al. (1990) provided an upper bound for the equilibrium payoffs of a long-run player facing infinitely many short-run players under imperfect public monitoring, which is independent of the discount factor of the long-run player and might be strictly less than the Stackelberg payoff. Hence, Fudenberg and Levine (1992) 's 1 The only other such paper we know of is Peski (2008) . 2 There are well-known examples of lack of lower hemi-continuity in dynamic games with asymmetric information. See for example, Section 14.4.1 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) . 3 Cripps et al. (2004) conjecture the following affirmative hypothesis in their paper, which appears as a presumption for their Theorem 3: There exists a particular equilibrium in the complete information game and a bound such that for any commitment type prior that is less than this bound, there exists an equilibrium of the incomplete information game where the long-run player's payoff is arbitrarily close to her payoff from this particular equilibrium of the complete information game. This is not exactly the lower-hemi continuity counterpart of our main result, but it is a necessary condition for the lower-hemi continuity counterpart of our main result. In a footnote, Cripps et al. (2004) writes: "We conjecture this hypothesis is redundant, given the other conditions of the theorem, but have not been able to prove it." Unfortunately, we also fail to provide such a proof. Yet, an immediate corollary to our main result implies that one can identify a particular equilibrium in the complete information game and a sequence of priors converging to zero such that each incomplete information game with those priors has an equilibrium with the long-run player payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff from the particular equilibrium of the complete information game. Clearly, in the very special case when the complete information equilibrium payoff set of the long-run player is a singleton, our result implies that the continuity hypothesis conjecture of Cripps et al. (2004) is true.
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results imply that under imperfect public monitoring new equilibrium payoffs may arise with incomplete information when the discount factor of the long-run player is sufficiently high.
Even though the results of Levine (1989, 1992) hold for both perfect and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps et al. (2004) showed that reputation effects are not sustainable in the long-run when there is imperfect public monitoring. In other words, it is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the complete information game under imperfect public monitoring.
Since Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson's (2004) work, there has been a large literature which studies the possibility / impossibility of maintaining permanent reputations: Ekmekci (2011) showed that reputation can be sustained permanently in the steady state by using rating systems. Ekmekci et al. (2012) showed that impermanent types would lead to permanent reputations, as well. Atakan and Ekmekci (2012 , 2013 , 2015 provided positive and negative results on permanent reputations with long-lived players on both sides. Liu (2011) provided dynamics that explain accumulation, consumption, and restoration of reputation when the discovery of the past is costly. Liu and Skrzypacz (2014) provided similar dynamics for reputations when there is limited record-keeping.
To sum up, the adverse selection approach to study reputations in repeated games has been quite fruitful. This approach teaches us that reputational concerns can explain the emergence of intuitive equilibria in both finitely and infinitely repeated games. There has been considerable amount of work in the literature which focus on whether or not it is possible to maintain a permanent reputation and how reputation is accumulated, consumed, and restored.
The next section describes our model. Section 3 provides a motivating example, Sect. 4 presents our main result, and Sect. 5 concludes the paper.
The model
Our model is a standard model of an infinitely repeated game with incomplete information under imperfect public monitoring. 4
The complete information game
A long-run player (Player 1) plays an infinitely repeated stage-game with a sequence of different short-run players (Player 2). The stage-game is a finite simultaneous-move game of imperfect public monitoring. The action sets of Player 1 and Player 2 in the stage-game are denoted by I and J , respectively. The public signal, y, is drawn from a finite set, Y . The probability that y is realized under the action profile (i, j) is given by ρ y i j .
The ex ante stage-game payoffs are given by u 1 (i, j) and u 2 (i, j). Player 1 ("she") is a long-run player with a fixed discount factor δ < 1. Her payoff in the infinitely repeated game is the average discounted sum of stage-game payoffs, 
Player 2, the short-lived players, only observes the public history, i.e., (y 0 , y 1 , . . . ,
A behavioral strategy for Player 1 is denoted by σ 1 :
∞ t=0 H 1t → (I ), whereas a behavioral strategy for Player 2 is denoted by σ 2 : 
In equilibrium, the short-run player plays a best-response after every equilibrium history. Player 2's strategy σ 2 is a best-response to σ 1 if, for all t,
The set of such best-responses are denoted by B R 2 (σ 1 ).
We continue with the definition of a Nash equilibrium in the complete information game:
Definition 1 A Nash equilibrium of the complete information game is a strategy
We assume that the monitoring structure has full support. That is, every signal y is possible after any action profile.
Remark 1 The full-support monitoring assumption ensures that all finite sequences of public signals occur with positive probability, hence must be followed by optimal behavior in any Nash equilibrium. Therefore, any Nash equilibrium outcome is also a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, since there is only one long-run and one short-run player, Nash equilibrium outcomes coincide with perfect public equilibrium outcomes. 5
The incomplete information game
There is incomplete information regarding the type of the long-run Player 1. At time t = −1, Player 1's type is selected. With probability 1 − p 0 > 0, Player 1 ("she") is a "(n)ormal" type long-run player with a fixed discount factor δ < 1. Her payoff in the infinitely repeated game is the average discounted sum of stage-game payoffs,
. With probability p 0 > 0, she is a "(c)ommitment" type who always, independent of history, plays the same (possibly mixed) action s 1 ∈ (I ) in each period. 6 A state of the world is now a type for Player 1 and sequence of actions and signals. The set of states is = {n, c} × (I × J × Y ) ∞ with generic outcome w. The prior p 0 , commitment strategy, and the strategy profile of the normal playersσ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) induce a probability measure P over , which describes how an uninformed player expects play to evolve. 7 The strategy profileσ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) determines a probability measure P over , which describes how play evolves when Player 1 is the normal type. Let E[·] denote unconditional expectations taken with respect to the measure P and E[·] denote the conditional expectations taken with respect to the measure P. 8 Given the strategy σ 2 , the normal type Player 1 has the same objective function as in the complete information game. Player 2, on the other hand, is maximizing E[u 2 (i t , j)|H t ], so that after any history h t , he is updating his beliefs over the type of Player 1 that he is facing. The profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information game if each player is playing a best-response. At any equilibrium, Player 2's posterior belief in period t that Player 1 is the commitment type is given by the H t -measurable random variable p t : → [0, 1]. By Assumption 1, Bayes' rule determines this posterior after all sequences of signals. Thus, in period t, Player 2 is maximizing
The reputation of Player 1 is modeled as the belief of short-lived Player 2's regarding Player 1's type. Hence, in period t, it is quantified as Player 2's posterior belief p t .
Let V ( p 0 , δ) denote the equilibrium payoff set of the (normal type) long-run Player 1 when the ex ante commitment prior is p 0 and her discount factor is δ. In particular, V (0, δ) denotes the equilibrium payoff set of the long-run Player 1 with discount factor δ in the repeated game under complete information.
6
(I ) denotes the set of all possible probability distributions over I . 7 The filtrations {H 1t } ∞ t=0 and 
A motivating example
To motivate our main result and to show how it compares to Fudenberg and Levine (1992) , we provide an example of a moral-hazard mixing game (see . There is a long-lived seller (Player 1) who faces an infinite sequence of buyers (Player 2) who only plays the stage-game once. There are two actions available to the seller:, A 1 = {H, L}, where H and L denote producing a high-quality and a low-quality product, respectively. Each buyer also has two possible actions: buying the product (B) and not buying the product (N ), i.e., A 2 = {B, N }. Player 1 (the seller) is denoted as the row player, and Player 2 (each buyer) is denoted as the column player in the stage-game, with the following payoff matrix:
Note that there is a unique Nash equilibrium of this stage-game, and in this equilibrium the row player plays L (producing low quality) and the column player plays N (not buying the product). 9 Note also that a rational buyer (Player 2) would play B only if he anticipates that the seller (Player 1) plays H with a probability of at least 1 2 . Player 1's discount factor is δ < 1. The actions of Player 1 are not observed by the buyers. However, every period an informative public signal about Player 1's action is observed. Let Y = {h, l} be the set of signals. Let q > 2 3 be the probability of h occurring if Player 1 plays action H , and again for simplicity, q is the probability of l occurring if Player 1 plays L. 1011 There is a positive probability p 0 > 0 that the seller is an honorable firm (a commitment type) who always produces high-quality product, that is, she plays action H at every period of the repeated game independent of the history.
By employing techniques introduced by Abreu et al. (1990) , it can be shown that in the repeated game with complete information, i.e., when there is no commitment type, any v ∈ 0, 1 − 1−q 2q−1 is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff of Player 1 for any δ > δ for some δ < 1, and no value outside of this range is an equilibrium payoff of Player 1 for any discount factor. That is, V (0, δ) = 0, 1 − 1−q 2q−1 for any δ > δ. 12 Below, we show that for any δ > δ there exists an η > 0 such that any perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium payoff of the long-lived seller (Player 1) in the incomplete information game is close to the set of her subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the complete information game when p 0 < η. 9 Notice also that the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game is not efficient. 10 Note that the signals are independent of Player 2's choice of action here.
11 It can be shown that when q ≤ 2 3 the complete information equilibrium payoff set is the singleton {0}. 12 For the details of this argument, we refer the reader to Mailath and Samuelson (2006, section 3.6 Proof Suppose the probability that Player 1 is the commitment type is p 0 and she is expected to play H with probability α > p 0 . 14 Let p 1 (y) be the posterior probability that Player 1 is a commitment type after a signal y is observed. Bayes' rule yields:
. For a given ζ > 0, let t * be such that δ t * < ζ 2 , and let η = 1 2 κ t * , and p 0 < η. We have two observations that are true at any period t < t * :
(i) At any period t after any history, the posterior probability with which Player 1 is a commitment type is less than 1 2 . This is simply because for any t ≤ t * the posterior will be at most κ times the prior and p 0 < η = 1 2 κ t * .
(ii) In any equilibrium, if Player 2's action is B after some public history, h t , then H should be in the support of Player 1's strategy at time t. This is because, as mentioned before, to induce Player 2 to play B, the overall probability assigned to H should be at least 1 2 and by (i) the posterior at t that Player 1 is a commitment type is less than
where V (μ, δ) is the set of equilibrium payoffs of Player 1 for the commitment prior probability μ. Hence, v is an upper bound for the continuation payoffs for Player 1 in the incomplete information game when t ≤ t * . Suppose p 0 < η and q > 2 3 ; following (i) and (ii), if Player 2's action is B at h t , then H should be in the support of Player 1's action. Hence, Player 1's payoff is no more than
where v h and v l are the continuation payoffs for signals h and l, respectively. The incentive constraint that induces Player 1 to put a positive probability on H is given by
13 It is possible to replicate Claim 1 for δ ≤δ but this is omitted since it adds no further insight to the main result. 14 Note that here we refer to Player 1 considering both the normal and commitment types. That is,
where α 1 (H ) is the probability with which the normal type of Player 1 chooses to play H . 15 To be more precise, σ 2 (h t ) = B implies H ∈ supp(σ 1 (h 1t )) for some h 1t compatible with h t .
Let v( p 0 , δ) be any equilibrium payoff of Player 1 in the incomplete information game where the commitment prior is p 0 and her discount factor is δ.
Combining (1) and (2) with the fact that v h ≤ v and v l ≤ v gives us
On the other hand, if H is not in the support of Player 1's action,
An interpretation of inequality (3) is as follows: even though playing H gives Player 1 a current payoff of 1 when Player 2 plays B, she bears an informational current payoff loss of 1−q 2q−1 due to imperfect monitoring. Iterating forward gives:
Since v(μ, δ) ≤ 2 for all μ ∈ [0, 1]-since 2 is the highest payoff that Player 1 can get in the stage game-and since δ t * < ζ 2 , we get
That is, whenever
Since Player 1's equilibrium payoff is bounded below by 0, this means any equilibrium payoff of the incomplete information game is close to the set of equilibrium payoffs of the complete information game when p 0 < η as claimed. Technically, we had shown for a fixed δ > δ, given any ζ there exists an η such that when
In the incomplete information game, for every t * we can choose a prior p 0 small enough such that for every t ≤ t * Player 1's reputation level is less than 1 2 , irrespective of her strategy. 16 Hence, at any of these periods inducing Player 2 to play B bears the same cost, 1−q 2q−1 , on Player 1. For a fixed discount factor δ, if t * is large enough, payoffs after t * have almost no effect on Player 1's average discounted payoff in the repeated game.
Next, let us note what the main result of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) implies for this example:
Claim 2 (Fudenberg and Levine 1992) 
Proof See Corollary 3.2 of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) . Therefore, Fudenberg and Levine (1992) imply that when the long-lived seller (Player 1) becomes arbitrarily patient, i.e., as δ → 1, she guarantees herself a payoff close to 1 as long as p 0 > 0. The intuition behind their result is that by mimicking the commitment type often enough, a strategic long-run player can make her short-run opponents believe that she is a commitment type with sufficiently high probability. This will induce the short-run players to best respond to the commitment action except for a finite number of periods. But, when δ tends to 1 this finite number of periods will not matter, hence a lower bound for the equilibrium payoff of the arbitrarily patient long-run player will be the payoff that he can get by publicly committing herself to the action of the commitment type. 17 On the other hand, our Claim 1 implies that for every (fixed) δ > δ given any ζ there exists an η such that when p 0 ∈ (0, η), v( p 0 , δ) ≤ 1 − 1−q 2q−1 + ζ . The intuition behind Claim 1 is that no matter how high the discount factor δ is, as long as it is fixed, there will come a time period t * such that the effect of periods after t * on the average discounted sum of payoffs will be negligible. Therefore, if commitment prior is so small that it takes for the long-run Player 1 longer than t * to convince Player 2s that he is the commitment type with sufficiently high probability (greater than 1 2 ) then the incomplete information equilibrium payoffs seems not far away from the complete information payoffs.
To note the difference numerically, let q = 18 That is, no matter how high the discount factor is, as long as it is fixed, the largest equilibrium payoff to the long-lived seller is less than (or equal to) 0.501 for arbitrarily small commitment priors. On the other hand, no matter how small the commitment prior is, as long as it is fixed, the smallest equilibrium payoff to the long-lived seller will converge to 1 for arbitrarily large discount factors. These two results together clarify the importance of the order of limits in the standard reputation result.
Formally, the role of order of limits in terms of upper and lower bounds on equilibrium payoffs for the motivating example can be summarized by the following corollary: 19
17 Observe that in the motivating example, the action of the commitment type is H and if Player 2s know that Player 1 is committed to play H then their best response would be B which will induce a payoff of 1 to Player 1. 18 For q = 2 3 , δ = 0.99, and ζ = 0.001, the corresponding η can be easily calculated as 1/2 3 757 . 19 Note that there is no known algorithm yet to compute the exact incomplete information equilibrium payoff set V ( p 0 , δ) . Hence, the order of limits result provided here is just about the lower bounds and upper bounds of equilibrium payoff sets. In the Sect. 4.5, it will be further clarified why a general order of limits result cannot be obtained in the form lim δ→1
Proof From Claim 1, it follows that given any ζ > 0 there exits η > 0 such that 
Main result
We are ready to provide our main result. We note once again that V ( p 0 , δ) denotes the equilibrium payoff set of the long-run player with the fixed discount factor δ in the incomplete information repeated game with the ex ante commitment prior p 0 , and V (0, δ) denotes the equilibrium payoff set of the long-run player with the fixed discount factor δ in the repeated game under complete information.
Our main result is the following: In words, our main result says that introducing arbitrarily small incomplete information does not open the possibility of new equilibrium payoffs that are far from the complete information equilibrium payoff set, even when the long-run player's discount factor is very high but fixed.
Outline of the proof
We proceed as follows: first, we introduce the standard set operator à la Abreu et al. (1990) particular to our setting, which gives us decomposable payoffs for the longrun player in a given set. When applied repeatedly to a compact set that includes all stage-game payoffs of the long-run player, this operator converges to the complete information equilibrium payoff set of the long-run player. Then, we slightly modify this operator to introduce a new set operator. The modification is that Player 2, any of the short-run players, is not restricted to best-respond to the enforcing action of Player 1, but is allowed to best-respond to some (possibly mixed) action that is close (in the Euclidean metric) to the enforcing action.
In our first lemma, we show that there exists a distanceε > 0 such that all bestresponses to this particular action are also best-responses to some (possibly mixed) action whose support is within the support of the action of the normal type of the long-run player. The essence of the argument is that theε in Lemma 1 is uniform over all possible supports. In Lemma 2, we show that the two operators coincide for any distance smaller thanε. The essence of Lemma 2 is that the operators coincide 123 uniformly over all possible subsets of the real line. Lemma 3 extends the result of Lemma 2 to arbitrary iterations using these uniformities.
The rest of the proof makes use of the fact that the discount factor is fixed and hence a finite number of iterations, t * , suffices to approximate the set of all complete information equilibrium payoffs of the long-run player. When the commitment prior in the incomplete information game is small enough, the posterior after the first t * periods stays below a certain threshold due to full-support monitoring. Employing Lemma 3 allows us to show that one can identify a bound over the commitment prior so that the equilibrium payoffs of the long-run player in the incomplete information game with a prior less than this bound cannot be too far from her complete information equilibrium payoffs.
The set operator
We start by introducing the standard set operator, T , of Abreu et al. (1990) :
Consider the operator T : 2 R \{∅} → 2 R \{∅} defined as follows: v ∈ T (W ) if and only if there exists a non-empty
This operator identifies decomposable payoffs of the long-run player for a given set, W ∈ R. Here, (i) corresponds to feasibility, (ii) corresponds to incentive compatibility conditions, and (iii) simply says that Player 2 (a short-run player) is best-responding to the enforcing action of the long-run player.
Let M = max i, j |u 1 (i, j)|, and let M] . It follows from the techniques introduced by Abreu et al. (1990) 
Next, consider the incomplete information game: recall that in period t Player 2 is best-responding to α 1 , where α 1 = p t s 1 + (1 − p t )α 1 and σ 1 (h 1t ) = α 1 , and p t is the posterior at time t that Player 1 is a commitment type. Observe that when p t happens to be arbitrarily small so is the Euclidean distance ||α 1 − α 1 ||. 20 Utilizing this observation, we next define our set operator by relaxing condition (iii) of the operator T as follows:
For any ε > 0, let T ε : 2 R \{∅} → 2 R \{∅} be such that: 
T ε is slightly more permissive than the T of Abreu et al. (1990) , inasmuch as it only requires the short-run player to best-respond to an action that is close, in Euclidean metric, to the one played by the long-run player.
The motivation for our operator is as follows: In the game of incomplete information, the mixed action to which the short-run player best-responds is a weighted average of the action taken by the normal type of the long-run player and the commitment type's action. Provided that the latter type is very unlikely, this means that the short-run player is taking a best-response to an action that is nearly the normal type's action. The key to our main result will be then to show that, if the short-run player best-responds to an action that is close to the probability distributions over a set of actions, then he is actually also playing a best-response to an action within that set if the distance between the original action and the set of probability distributions over this set of actions is sufficiently small.
It is clear that both operators T and T ε are monotone. That is, if
Lemmata
We provide 3 lemmata, which will be used in the proof of our main result. All of the proofs of these lemmata are provided in the Appendix.
We start with a technical lemma that is key to our main result. In words, Lemma 1 says that if a short-run player best-responds to an action that is close to the set of probability distributions over a set of actions, then he is also playing a best-response to an action within this set of probability distributions as long as the Euclidean distance between the original action and the set of probability distributions is sufficiently small.
Let B R 2 ( (X )) := {α 2 ∈ (J ) : α 2 ∈ B R 2 (α 1 ) for some α 1 ∈ (X )} for any X ⊆ I .
Lemma 1 There exists anε > 0 for all non-empty X I such that
It is essential to note about Lemma 1 that theε is uniform over X I , i.e., a fixed ε works for all X I . 
Order of limits
To clarify how our main result identifies the role of the order of limits in reputations, let V : [0, 1) 2 → 2 R be the function which gives the equilibrium payoff set of long-run Player 1 for any commitment prior, discount factor pair, ( p 0 , δ), where 2 R denotes the power set of R. That is, as before, V ( p 0 , δ) is the equilibrium payoff set of Player 1 when the commitment prior is p 0 and the discount factor of Player 1 is δ.
Unfortunately, we cannot provide the following inequality:
The technical reason why one cannot provide inequality (7) is because there is no standard topology (or metric) defined on the power set of R where the limits in inequality (7) are well-defined.
A commonly used metric for defining limits of sequences of sets is the Hausdorff metric, which is defined as follows: (v, w) But, the Hausdorff metric is a metric only for the compact subsets of R. Yet, we do not know whether V ( p 0 , δ) is compact for when p 0 is positive. 25 However, whenever the Stackelberg payoff is not attainable in the stage game, it is possible to obtain the following order of limits result in terms of upper and lower bounds of the equilibrium payoff sets which will imply that the sets in question in inequality (7) 
Proof Proposition 3 of Fudenberg et al. (1990) Fudenberg and Levine (1992) since it implies lim δ→1 v( p 0 , δ) ≥ S for any p 0 ∈ (0, 1).
Corollary 2 implies that, according to the intuition behind the Hausdorff metrictwo sets are close if every point of either set is close to some point of the other set-the corresponding limit equilibrium payoff sets in question above in inequality (7) are not close. An upper bound for the limit set on the left hand side of (7) is less than a lower bound of the limit set on the right hand side of (7) This means if the equilibrium payoff sets were all compact for any commitment prior and any discount factor then limits in inequality (7) will be well defined with respect to the Hausdorff metric and hence inequality (7) will hold true.
As discussed earlier, Fudenberg and Levine (1992) 's reputation result show that when the long-run player (Player 1) becomes arbitrarily patient (δ → 1) she guarantees herself a payoff close to her Stackelberg payoff as long as ex ante probability of the Stackelberg (commitment) type is positive-no matter how small it is. The intuition behind their result is that by mimicking the Stackelberg type often enough, the longrun player can convince short-run players that she is the Stackelberg (commitment) type with sufficiently high probability. Hence, the short-run players will best respond to the Stackelberg action except for a finite number of periods. When δ → 1 this finite number of periods will not matter.
On the other hand, our main result implies that when the commitment prior is arbitrarily small ( p 0 → 0) any incomplete information payoff will be close to a complete information payoff-no matter how large the discount factor is. The intuition behind our result is simple: when the discount factor δ is fixed, there will be a time period t * such that the effect of periods after t * on the average discounted sum of payoffs are negligible. Hence, for arbitrarily small commitment priors, it will take longer than t * for the long-run player to convince short-run players that he is the Stackelberg type with sufficiently high probability-to induce them to best respond to the Stackelberg action. Therefore, the effect of introducing arbitrarily small incomplete information on the equilibrium payoffs will be negligible as well.
Conclusion
The main result of this paper is essentially an upper-hemi continuity result concerning the equilibrium payoffs in reputation games where a long-run player faces an infinite sequence of short-run players. Technically, we showed that in these games the Nash equilibrium correspondence is, for a fixed discount factor, upper-hemi continuous in the prior probability that the long-run player is a commitment type at zero when there is full-support imperfect public monitoring.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result that explicitly provides a proof for this particular upper-hemi continuity property, which highlights the order of limits issue in the reputations literature: our result highlights that-as anticipated-the order of limits is important in some of the standard reputation results. If the discount factor of the long-run player tends to 1 before the commitment type's ex ante probability tends to 0, then the aforementioned reputation results à la Fudenberg and Levine (1992) are expected to hold true; however, if the commitment type's ex ante probability tends to 0 before the discount factor of the long-run player tends to 1, then the incomplete information equilibrium payoffs cannot be far from the complete information equilibrium payoff set.
Unfortunately, even though an affirmative necessary condition was conjectured by Cripps et al. (2004) , the corresponding lower-hemi continuity result remains to be an open problem for further research.
Our result may not hold when the full-support monitoring assumption is missing. For example, in the extreme case of perfect monitoring, it can be shown that the incomplete information equilibrium payoff of Player 1 can only differ from a complete information equilibrium payoff by one period payoff. But since we fix δ < 1, this fact does not provide a counterpoint to the continuity result in this paper.
Finally, we believe that the method of proof we provide is a novel application of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti's (1990) techniques in repeated games with incomplete information. We hope that our work will inspire other researchers to use these techniques to tackle similar problems in the literature.
